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A mixed methods analysis of lithium-related patient safety incidents in primary care  
  
ABSTRACT 
Background: Lithium is a drug with a narrow therapeutic range and has been associated with 
a number of serious adverse effects. The present study aimed to characterise primary care 
lithium-related patient safety incidents submitted to the National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS) database with respect to incident origin, type, contributory factors and 
outcome. The intention was to identify ways to minimise risk to future patients by examining 
incidents with a range of harm outcomes. 
Methods: A mixed methods study of patient safety incident reports related to lithium was 
conducted. Data from healthcare organisations in England and Wales were extracted from the 
NRLS database. An exploratory descriptive analysis was undertaken to characterise the most 
frequent incident types, the associated chain of events and other contributory factors. 
Results: 174 reports containing the term ‘Lithium’ were identified. Of these, 41 were excluded 
and from the remaining 133 reports, 138 incidents were identified and coded. Community 
pharmacies reported 100 incidents (96 dispensing related, 2 administration, 2 other), GP 
practices filed 22 reports, and 16 reports originated from other sources. A total of 99 
dispensing-related incidents were recorded, 39 resulted from the wrong medication 
dispensed, 31 the wrong strength, 8 the wrong quantity and 21 other. 128 contributory factors 
were identified overall; for dispensing incidents, the most common related to medication 
storage/packaging (n=41), and “mistakes” (n=22) whilst no information regarding contributory 
factors was provided in 41 reports. 
Conclusions: Despite the established link between medication packaging and the risk of 
dispensing errors, our study highlighted storage and packaging as the most commonly cited 
contributory factors to dispensing errors. The absence of certain relevant data limited the 
ability to fully characterise a number of reports. This highlighted the need to include clear and 
complete information when submitting reports. This, in turn, may help to better inform the 
further development of interventions designed to reduce incident numbers and improve patient 
safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Lay title and summary: 
A characterisation of lithium-related patient safety incidents in primary care  
Lithium is an effective treatment for certain mental illnesses, but has a number of harmful side 
effects. Safety incidents related to medicines in the UK are reported to the National Reporting 
and Learning System database (NRLS), and concerns relating to lithium have previously been 
highlighted. This study aimed to characterise lithium incidents reported to the NRLS that 
occurred in a primary care setting. Reports relating to lithium, and submitted between 2002 
and 2013 were reviewed, and the information coded. 174 reports containing the term ‘Lithium’ 
were identified. Of these, 41 were excluded and from the remaining 133 reports, 138 incidents 
were identified and coded with respect to incident origin, type, contributory factors and 
outcome. 100 incidents were reported by Community pharmacies (96 of which related to 
medicine dispensing), GP practices filed 22 reports, and 16 reports originated from other 
sources. Of the dispensing-related incidents, 39 resulted from the wrong medication 
dispensed, 31 the wrong strength, 8 the wrong quantity and 21 other. 128 contributory factors 
were identified overall; for dispensing incidents, the most common related to medication 
storage/packaging (n=41), and “mistakes” (n=22) whilst no information regarding contributory 
factors was provided in 41 reports. Despite the established link between medication packaging 
and the risk of dispensing errors, our study highlighted storage and packaging as the most 
commonly cited contributory factors to dispensing errors. The absence of certain relevant data 
limited the ability to fully characterise a number of reports. This highlighted the need to include 
clear and complete information when submitting reports. This, in turn, may help to better inform 
the further development of interventions designed to reduce incident numbers and improve 
patient safety. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Lithium has been shown to be an effective treatment for the management of bipolar affective 
disorder1 and as an augmentation strategy in unipolar depression.2 However, the clinical use 
of lithium is complicated by its narrow therapeutic range and adverse effects, such as those 
affecting the thyroid and parathyroid glands and the kidney, all of which require regular 
monitoring.3 Adverse patient outcomes associated with lithium in the United Kingdom were 
highlighted by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in 2009, with its publication “Safer 
lithium therapy”.4 This report identified a number of fatalities and other serious adverse events 
that had occurred as a result of lithium therapy using the National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS) database. This database records reports of patient safety incidents resulting 
 3 
from healthcare interventions made in the UK (available at: 
https://report.nrls.nhs.uk/nrlsreporting/). Following a review of incident reports involving 
severe harm associated with lithium, the NPSA introduced clear guidelines to help healthcare 
professionals to address these problems. The document suggested measures that were 
required to be implemented by healthcare providers by December 2010, including 
requirements for pharmacists prior to dispensing lithium and greater patient engagement 
through the Lithium Therapy Record Book.5 
  
Whilst serious patient safety incidents have been a significant driver for improving patient 
safety,6 it has also been noted that incidents resulting in non-serious harm should not be 
overlooked.7 Incidents that result in mild harm or no harm have the potential to contribute to 
more serious harm if they are overlooked or measures not put in place to address them. The 
Heinrich ratio estimated that in an industry setting for every 300 no injury incidents, there would 
be one major injury8. In addition to assessing the effectiveness of reporting systems, these no 
injury incidents provide a focus for driving system change.7 Despite this, there is some 
evidence to suggest that severity of harm was a factor in determining pharmacist led error 
reporting in a hospital setting.9 As noted above, severe harms associated with lithium have 
been the subject of a previous report. However, the nature of lithium related incidents 
occurring in primary care settings, with varying degrees of harm, has been less widely 
reported. 
  
The present study aimed to characterise all primary care lithium-related patient safety 
incidents submitted to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) database. The 
intention being to identify ways to minimise risk to future patients by examining incidents with 
a range of harm outcomes. 
  
  
METHODS 
We carried out a cross-sectional, mixed methods study of patients who were the subject of a 
patient safety incident report related to the medication, lithium. This combined a detailed data 
coding process and iterative generation of data summaries using descriptive statistical and 
thematic analysis methods as described by Carson-Stevens et al.10 
  
Data source 
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The primary data for the study were extracted from an archive of the NRLS database of patient 
safety incident reports from healthcare organisations in England and Wales.  A patient safety 
incident is defined as: “any unintended or unexpected incident that could have harmed or did 
harm a patient during healthcare delivery”.11 Reporting began in 2003 on a voluntary basis 
but, since 2010, it has been mandatory to report any incident that resulted in severe patient 
harm or death. Each report contains structured information about location, patient 
demographics, and the reporter’s perception of severity of harm, complemented by 
unstructured free-text descriptions of the incident, potential contributory factors, and planned 
actions to prevent reoccurrence. The database was described in more detail in a study of 
patient safety-related hospital deaths in England.12  
  
Study population 
The study included incidents occurring from 2003 (when the database launched) to 30th 
September 2013, which was the full cross-section of data available at the outset of our study. 
In this time, a total of 272,884 incident reports were submitted by primary care services to the 
central database of patient safety incidents. The free text fields of the database were searched 
for terms related to lithium including all common brand names. (see Appendix 1 for full list). 
Of the incidents identified, a number were excluded either because the report was a duplicate, 
contained insufficient detail, or because, on detailed scrutiny, the incident was found not to 
have occurred in primary care or did not directly involve lithium. 
  
Data coding 
Two clinical researchers familiar with the treatment of mental illness were trained in root cause 
analysis and the role of human factors in healthcare. This team reviewed the free text 
component of each incident report and coded the information in relation to: the type of safety 
incident that directly affected patient care (e.g. prescribing error) and the chain of events 
leading up to the safety incident (e.g. communication error between staff); the contributory 
factors (e.g. staff knowledge); and reported patient harm outcomes with harm severity 
classified according to World Health Organisation (WHO) International Classification for 
Patient Safety definitions.14 Each report was coded independently by both researchers and 
any discordance was discussed to ensure correct interpretation of codes and their definitions. 
Difficult cases were discussed and a third investigator, arbitrated where necessary. The 
process has previously been described in more detail.10 
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Data analyses 
We undertook exploratory descriptive analysis to assess all relevant incident types, the 
associated chain of events and other contributory factors. Vignettes were discussed as a team 
to identify salient themes amongst reports with similar characteristics (incident type, 
contributing factor, outcomes), which could be considered as targets for the prevention of 
future incidents.  
  
Ethical approval 
Aneurin Bevan University Health Board (AB HB) Research Risk Review Committee judged 
the study as using anonymised data for service improvement purposes and approved it on 
this basis (ABHB R&D Ref number: SA/410/13). 
 
  
RESULTS 
From the available dataset of 272,884 incident reports, 174 incident reports containing the 
term ‘lithium’ were identified. Of these, 41 were excluded, (22 unrelated to lithium, 17 had 
insufficient information to allow coding, and two duplicate reports), and from the remaining 133 
reports, 138 incidents were identified and coded (some reports included more than one 
identifiable incident). It was noted that the number of incidents reported per year increased 
over time, from four in 2002 to 24 in 2013 (see Figure 1).  
  
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Number of primary care incidents relating to lithium, originating from different 
healthcare professional groups 
 
 
 
Incident origin 
Incidents were grouped into those originating from community pharmacy, General 
Practitioners (GPs), mental health services and other (including nurses and other hospital 
staff). Of the total, community pharmacies reported 100 (72%) incidents (96 were dispensing 
related, two relating to administration and two classified as other), GP practices filed 22 (16%) 
reports, 13 (9%) reports originated from other sources, and three (2%) from mental health 
services. The number of incidents according to reporter type and year are shown in Figure 1. 
  
Incident type 
The 138 incidents were categorized as being related to either prescribing, dispensing, 
administration, lithium monitoring, communication or other (such as record keeping and 
decision making); see Table 1 for details. A total of 99 dispensing-related incidents were 
recorded representing 72% of incidents overall. Of the dispensing incidents, 39 resulted from 
the wrong medication being dispensed (34 of which involved Priadel® and Plaquenil®), 31 the 
wrong strength, 8 the wrong quantity and 21 classified as other (see Table 2 for details). The 
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remaining 39 (28%) incidents related to monitoring (n=13), prescribing (n=8), communication 
(n=7), other (n=6) and administration (n=5).  
  
 
Table 1: Incident type, grouped according to reporting healthcare professional 
 Incident report origin  
Incident type 
Community 
pharmacy 
n=100 (%) 
General 
Practice 
n=22 (%) 
Mental 
Health 
n=3 (%) 
 
Other 
n=13 (%) 
 
Total 
n=138 (%) 
Dispensing 96 (96%) 2 (9%) 1 (33%) 0 (0%) 99 (72%) 
Prescribing 0 (0%) 3 (14%) 1 (33%) 4 (31%) 8 (6%) 
Administration 2 (2%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 2 (15%) 5 (4%) 
Monitoring 0 (0%) 8 (36%) 0 (0%) 5 (38%) 13 (9%) 
Communication 0 (0%) 5 (23%) 0 (0%) 2 (15%) 7 (5%) 
Other 2 (2%) 3 (14%) 1 (33%) 0 (0%) 6 (4%) 
 
 
Table 2: Details of dispensing incident types. 
Dispensing Incident type Number  
n=99 (%) 
Wrong medicine 39 (39) 
Wrong strength 31 (31) 
Wrong quantity 8 (8) 
Wrong patient 4 (4) 
Wrong dose timing 4 (4) 
Wrong formulation 4 (4) 
Wrong label 3 (3) 
Wrong dose 3 (3) 
Contraindicated medication dispensed 1 (1) 
Discontinued medication dispensed 1 (1) 
Out of date medication dispensed 1 (1) 
 
 
Contributory factors 
A total of 128 contributory factors were identified for 82 of the incidents reported, whilst no 
information was available for 56 incidents. Overall, the most common contributory factor was 
medication storage or packaging in relation to dispensing incidents (n=41), followed by a 
cognitive error (such as a mistake or inattention), which occurred in the context of most error 
types. 97 contributory factors were identified for 58/99 of the dispensing incidents (some 
incidents had more than one identified contributory factor), whilst no information was available 
for 41/99, as the relevant section of the NRLS data collection form was left blank. The most 
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commonly cited contributory factor for dispensing incidents was medication storage or 
packaging (n=41), where the similarity of the packaging between two medicines with similar 
names (Priadel® and Plaquenil®) was commonly noted. Other factors were cognitive errors 
(n=23), working conditions (n=18) (where being busy and being interrupted were commonly 
noted), process not followed (n=8), continuity of care (n=3), lack of protocol (n=2) and other 
(n=2).  
   
Outcome and harm 
No outcome (as the relevant section of the NRLS data collection form was left blank) or an 
unclear outcome with insufficient detail to allow coding was reported for 84 (61%) incidents. 
74 outcomes were reported for the remaining 54 coded incidents (more than one outcome 
was possible for each incident). The most frequently reported outcomes were requirement for 
repeated visit to a health care provider (n=24; 32%), hospital admission (n=10; 14%), 
unplanned change in dosing (n=9; 13%), treating of the patient with insufficient information 
(n=6; 8%) and need for repeated tests (n=5; 7%). 
  
Patient harms resulting from the incidents were reported for only 63/138 incidents. Where 
harm was reported, it was classified as no harm (n=8), no harm due to mitigating action (n=32), 
mild (n=10), moderate (n=9) and severe (n=4; 2 reports with 4 incidents). The severe harms 
all required hospital admission (three of the four resulted from medication overdose) and all 
occurred prior to 2011. 
  
  
DISCUSSION 
This study investigated incidents relating to the use of lithium in primary care in England and 
Wales, reported to the NRLS database between 2003 and 2013. A total of 174 reports were 
identified and from these, 133 reports detailing 138 incidents were reviewed and coded. The 
frequency of reporting increased over time, with the largest number of incidents reported in 
2011. This was broadly in line with the increased level of reporting seen in the NRLS 
database13. The majority of the primary care reports submitted to the NRLS database and 
reviewed in this study related to errors made in the dispensing of lithium. Reports came largely 
from community pharmacy and incorrect medicine or incorrect strength dispensed were the 
most common incidents.  
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 Although the majority of incidents were associated with the dispensing process, this perhaps 
reflected the number of lithium reports submitted by community pharmacies compared with 
other professional groups. Community pharmacists reported 100 (72%) of the coded incidents, 
starting with a single report in 2005, followed by a significant increase in reporting from 2007 
onwards. The timing of this initial reporting, and the subsequent increase in reporting coincided 
with a change to the terms of the NHS Community Pharmacy Contractual Framework in 2005, 
which required all pharmacy contractors to report incidents to the NRLS.15 It has been 
suggested that the effectiveness of a reporting system can be based upon the ratio of severe 
to less severe harm reporting.7 Using the assumption that where no harm was reported a 
severe event had not occurred, the ratio of severe to less severe harms (1:99) reported by 
community pharmacies might be considered somewhat encouraging. However, briefing 
document 034/14 issued by the Pharmaceutical Services Negotiating Committee (PSNC) in 
2014,15 indicated that the level of reporting to the NRLS by community pharmacies was low, 
and put measures in place to address this. Given the estimated 1–3% incidence of dispensing 
incidents in community pharmacies16 and number of prescription items for lithium dispensed 
in Wales in 2012 alone (approximately 75,500 items data from the Comparative Analysis 
System for Prescribing Audit; NHS Wales Shared Services Partnership), these concerns over 
under-reporting appear well substantiated despite it being a contractual requirement.  
  
Whilst the number of reports submitted by community pharmacies in relation to the number of 
items dispensed was relatively low, it was significantly greater than that observed for other 
healthcare professionals. This may in part reflect the contractual obligation for community 
pharmacies to report using the NRLS database. It has been documented that all stages of the 
medication management process from prescribing to administration are associated with a risk 
of error.17 However, only 38 reports of lithium related incidents originated from other healthcare 
professionals. Furthermore, only 39 were associated with aspects of the medicines 
management process other than dispensing (see figure 2). A number of factors have been 
identified as barriers to the reporting of medication errors,18,19,20 which may have contributed 
to the limited quantity of reporting observed in our study. These include a lack of feedback to 
the reporter following incident submission, time constraints in completing reports, the 
complexity of navigating reporting systems and fear of blame. The low level of reporting and 
the focus on a single medicine were limitations of the study, and impact on the generalisability 
of the findings. Overall, the level of detail contained within the reports could have been 
improved. In a significant number of cases, there was insufficient detail to allow coding of the 
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incident or of contributory factors, and in some cases no details were provided for key aspects 
such as resulting outcomes and harms. This lack of information prevented full coding of these 
incidents and a similar lack of data quality has been reported elsewhere.21 Without a full 
description of the incident, it becomes more difficult to attempt to develop strategies such as 
driver diagrams and harness learning to facilitate change.22,23  
  
Despite the established link between medication packaging and the risk of dispensing24,25 and 
other errors,26 our study highlighted medicine storage or packaging as the most commonly 
cited contributory factor. The WHO “Medicines without harm” initiative identifies look-alike 
sound-alike medicine names, and labelling and packaging as frequent sources of error and 
harm that can be addressed.26 It was notable that the lithium brand Priadel® and the medicine 
Plaquenil®, both of which were manufactured by Sanofi Aventis and have similar names and 
packaging were the most frequently confused medicines. Strategies to address confusion of 
look-alike sound-alike names include the use of “Tall-Man” lettering on medicine labels.27 Tall-
man lettering utilises capitalisation for parts of the text of the medicine name, to highlight 
differences between similar names. Evidence to support this approach remains somewhat 
mixed, with little definitive evidence of a beneficial effect.28 A limitation in the evaluation of this 
strategy is the limited number of published studies; particularly those conducted in real-world 
settings (see Larmené-Beld et al, 2018 for review).27 Nevertheless, adoption of lists of 
medicines recommended for Tall Man lettering29,30 may represent a possible driver for 
reducing similar dispensing errors. Medication storage and packaging is likely to be an 
ongoing source of error in the dispensing process involving manual selection of medicines. 
Whilst automation has been shown to reduce some of the errors associated with dispensing,32 
other aspects of the medicines management process from prescribing to administration will 
undoubtedly continue to be subject to human error. 
 
Conclusion  
Despite lithium being a drug with a narrow therapeutic range that has been associated with 
serious harm, the number and quality of the primary care reports submitted to the NRLS 
database and reviewed in this study was limited. Although community pharmacy made a 
significant contribution to lithium-related incident reporting, the absence of certain relevant 
data limited the ability to fully characterise a number of reports. This highlighted a need for 
better understanding amongst reporters to include clear and complete information (e.g. 
contributory factors such as packaging and work environment) when submitting reports. This, 
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in turn, may help to better inform the further development of interventions designed to reduce 
incident numbers and improve patient safety.  
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Appendix 1, field searched and search terms:  
  
Free text fields searched: 
Description of what happened  
Actions preventing recurrence 
Apparent causes 
 
Search terms related to lithium: Lithium; priadel; camcolit; Li; Li-, Li+; Liskonum; purple book; 
purple-book 
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